The aestheticisation of culture and society is now a familiar theme in social and cultural philosophy. It refers to cultural transformations - associated with the idea of post-modernism - brought about the encroachment of market dynamics onto the terrain of everyday life. However, much of the literature in this area has eschewed any direct questioning of the nature of politics: preferring to interrogate the nature of identity in the media age, the ethics of consumerism and the metaphysics of technological change.
In contrast, the study of aesthetics and politics - or the aesthetics of politics - addresses questions of the nature of the political more directly. The idea here, is that there is an aesthetic dimension to all forms of politics. While the case of fascism is conspicuous and addressed in an extensive literature, basic aesthetic principles can be seen to hold across many forms of power. This is because politics is necessarily ‘artful’ - and manipulative - presupposing regularities in aesthetic techniques and repertoires. If we consider that power is the capacity to organise collective action, aesthetics can be seen as one decisive way in which that capacity in brought into play.
This may require an inquiry into the subliminal and unconscious dimensions of politics; into the power of images. `Images are vectors of communion’ (Maffesoli 1993); and it is through the aesthetic dimensions that politics becomes affective. Thus understanding politics aesthetically can be taken as an inquiry into the power of representation (except that this concerns not just visual but also tactile and auditory expressions). It concerns the libidinal dimension of politics including the sensory and sensual, imaginary and symbolic dimensions. This dimension is rarely discussed in political science and sociology because of the predilection for emphasising the rational self-interested element in political behaviour (as in rational choice theory). Furthermore, the conventional analytics of persuasion are also inadequate. They attempt to understand politics at the level of the cognitive and the conscious (as in brainwashing, propaganda, common sense, discourse or the construction of social reality through language and as text). This misses or underrates the kind of persuasion that is directly aimed at the emotions, the heart, the subconscious.
By framing questions of the political aesthetically allows the role of both art and artfulness to be explored in relation to contemporary political phenomena. Key questions here are: ‘ which aesthetic techniques are used for popular mobilisation?’: ‘How does politics operate through the organisation of space, both geographic and symbolic and imaginary space, through architecture, as and ritual and theatre?’: What forms and designs of popular culture motivate, influence and enthuse people?’
Is politics today an 'art form'?
Wednesday, 31 March 2010
Monday, 29 March 2010
The Dissolution of the Modern Monasteries?
In the 12th century the university replaced the monastery as the primary centre of learning and as a bastion of the ascetic ideal. Scholars replaced monks as guardians of sacred texts; often working alone for long hours in small cells!
In the late 20th century, universities became refuges for those on the left seeking an institutional base from which to launch a critique of contemporary capitalism. We might say that universities today are 'monasteries of the left'.
When viewed in this way, the post-modern attempt to turn universities into knowledge factories amounts to a second wave of monastery dissolution, and this is likely to continue unabated in the medium term.
Do universities have a future? If so, do they need to move away from the monastic model?
Neil Turnbull
In the late 20th century, universities became refuges for those on the left seeking an institutional base from which to launch a critique of contemporary capitalism. We might say that universities today are 'monasteries of the left'.
When viewed in this way, the post-modern attempt to turn universities into knowledge factories amounts to a second wave of monastery dissolution, and this is likely to continue unabated in the medium term.
Do universities have a future? If so, do they need to move away from the monastic model?
Neil Turnbull
Sunday, 28 March 2010
Francois Laruelle Day Conference: University of Nottingham, March 5th, 2010
Francois Laruelle is a leading French ‘non-philosopher’. He is often referred to as non-philosopher because he views philosophy as itself the object that is to be understood.
Non-philosophy is apparently not an anti-philosophy and his ideas in no way amount to a rejection of philosophy. For Laruelle, all philosophies attempt to think being from the point of view of transcendence whereas non-philosophy attempts to think being from the point of view of an immanence where there is no distinction between immanence and transcendence. Non-philosophy thus represents a mutation in the very practice of philosophy. It is philosophy’s adversary that defines philosophy and a mode of thought that attempts to depersonalise philosophy by turning philosophy against itself (Blanchot’s ‘neutralisation’).
According to the conference organisers, Laruelle’s philosophy consists of four stages.
In his early work, Laruelle thinks that philosophy is based on the idea of what he terms ‘the principle of sufficient philosophy’ - or the idea that everything is philosophical and philosophy can make sense of everything. Philosophy in this guise views everything in terms of a dualism of transcendental conditions and the empirically/experientially conditioned.
Laruelle wants to break with this conception of philosophy and develop what might be termed a science of philosophy so that we can ‘think philosophy’. For Laruelle, it is the experience of science that provides a model of a privileged thinking of the ‘one that is before being’.
In the last stage however, Laurelle no longer talks about philosophy but about ‘regional discourses’ and is now attempting a find a unified theory of philosophy and Christianity (Laruelle is a Gnostic non-philosopher).
The main issue with Laurelle’s philosophy is two fold: why does he view himself as a non-philosopher? Isn't this simply scientific realism in French fancy dress? And why does he think that it is science and not philosophy that is best equipped to think the real? Surely this idea is rather regressive in todays' intellectual, social and political context?
Laruelle seems to think that science gets things done whereas philosophy doesn’t and also that science has a more precise understanding of what immanence actually means. But this is highly contestable and perhaps a misunderstanding of how philosophy is itself remains the basis of science.
Neil Turnbull
Non-philosophy is apparently not an anti-philosophy and his ideas in no way amount to a rejection of philosophy. For Laruelle, all philosophies attempt to think being from the point of view of transcendence whereas non-philosophy attempts to think being from the point of view of an immanence where there is no distinction between immanence and transcendence. Non-philosophy thus represents a mutation in the very practice of philosophy. It is philosophy’s adversary that defines philosophy and a mode of thought that attempts to depersonalise philosophy by turning philosophy against itself (Blanchot’s ‘neutralisation’).
According to the conference organisers, Laruelle’s philosophy consists of four stages.
In his early work, Laruelle thinks that philosophy is based on the idea of what he terms ‘the principle of sufficient philosophy’ - or the idea that everything is philosophical and philosophy can make sense of everything. Philosophy in this guise views everything in terms of a dualism of transcendental conditions and the empirically/experientially conditioned.
Laruelle wants to break with this conception of philosophy and develop what might be termed a science of philosophy so that we can ‘think philosophy’. For Laruelle, it is the experience of science that provides a model of a privileged thinking of the ‘one that is before being’.
In the last stage however, Laurelle no longer talks about philosophy but about ‘regional discourses’ and is now attempting a find a unified theory of philosophy and Christianity (Laruelle is a Gnostic non-philosopher).
The main issue with Laurelle’s philosophy is two fold: why does he view himself as a non-philosopher? Isn't this simply scientific realism in French fancy dress? And why does he think that it is science and not philosophy that is best equipped to think the real? Surely this idea is rather regressive in todays' intellectual, social and political context?
Laruelle seems to think that science gets things done whereas philosophy doesn’t and also that science has a more precise understanding of what immanence actually means. But this is highly contestable and perhaps a misunderstanding of how philosophy is itself remains the basis of science.
Neil Turnbull
Saturday, 27 March 2010
Where is the 'the West'?
We often refer to 'Western Philosophy' or 'Western Culture'. But where exactly is 'the West'? Typically, by this term we mean more than a geographical area, as 'the West' includes not only Europe and the US but also Australia, New Zealand and possibly parts of South America!
But what about Japan? The reason that I ask this is that Japan seems in many ways more 'western' than 'the west'. It is arguably more technologically advanced; and if we view, with Heidegger, technology as the west's secret truth and 'historical destiny' then clearly Japan is part of this trajectory.
Moreover, the West is not only present in Japan, but Japan is now present in the West. Not only through the popularisation of manga etc either, but also through its industry - Britain has been the largest recipient of Japanese inward investment - and its management philosophies (such as just-in-time production, srong senses of corporare identification etc).
For centuries Japan was the west's cultural and intellectual other, but now it seems to defy the old occidental/oriental boundary. Japan is a cultural and philosophical hybrid.
So can we even legitimately refer to 'the west' anymore?
Neil Turnbull
But what about Japan? The reason that I ask this is that Japan seems in many ways more 'western' than 'the west'. It is arguably more technologically advanced; and if we view, with Heidegger, technology as the west's secret truth and 'historical destiny' then clearly Japan is part of this trajectory.
Moreover, the West is not only present in Japan, but Japan is now present in the West. Not only through the popularisation of manga etc either, but also through its industry - Britain has been the largest recipient of Japanese inward investment - and its management philosophies (such as just-in-time production, srong senses of corporare identification etc).
For centuries Japan was the west's cultural and intellectual other, but now it seems to defy the old occidental/oriental boundary. Japan is a cultural and philosophical hybrid.
So can we even legitimately refer to 'the west' anymore?
Neil Turnbull
Friday, 26 March 2010
Ecophilosophy interview
Hi Everyone
I am looking for participants for my ecophilosophy dissertation project. There will be 20 minutes interview sessions for each participant, and I will ask ten questions during this period. I will use phenomenological approach and all you need to do is reflect your opinions on simple questions about nature.
Please contact me ugur.parlar@gmail.com if you are interested. The interviews will be strictly confidential.
Best
Ugur
I am looking for participants for my ecophilosophy dissertation project. There will be 20 minutes interview sessions for each participant, and I will ask ten questions during this period. I will use phenomenological approach and all you need to do is reflect your opinions on simple questions about nature.
Please contact me ugur.parlar@gmail.com if you are interested. The interviews will be strictly confidential.
Best
Ugur
Fred and Ed's 'Academocracy' Talk
Yesterday (Thurs 25th) Fred and Ed Aspbury gave their long awaited presentation of their blueprint for an organised and rational political system.
Fred and Ed did a really good job of presenting their ideas and fielding questions. Well done to both of them!
At the beginning of their talk Fred and Ed castigated neo-liberal capitalism for its enfranchisement of the superficial desires of the new middle classes and for the way that it reduces politics to an empty and meaningless spectacle. Contemporary capitalism, in their view, is predicated on the the theft of the future by fundamentally selfish and self-destructive people.
But they think that ths situation is curable - but only if people stop being armchair revolutionaries and realise there is another world beyond the bland and apathatetic world of the politically disengaged masses.
They believe that they have come up with a viable blueprint for an alternative to neo-liberal capitalism. This a a model of a prgamatic system of government that bypasses the self-important individualism of today's political culture. It is a system based upon ideas of the common good rather than individual utility maximisation (Fred and Ed's intellectual heroes seem to be Plato and Zizek). Here, people are ruled by a wise elite - the grand council - who are not democratically elected as such but chosen from a number of local councils on the basis of their virtues and technical expertise. These are people who due to their 'excellence' have earned the right to decide.
Council members should be self-confident, assertive, knowledgeable and trustworthy. They are not motivated by self-interest because they have been trained for public service is special academies. They both believe and have pride in their political system and the political constitution on which it is based. The model has other features as well, such as model of socialised economic development. But this was its most striking and important feature.
There were a number of questions at the end, most of which were directed towards questions of accountability, the psychological motivations of the council members and the obvious similarities between this model and those proposed by radical conservatives in the 1930s.
Overall, a really stimulating presentation and discussion (that continued in the student bar afterwards).
Neil Turnbull
Fred and Ed did a really good job of presenting their ideas and fielding questions. Well done to both of them!
At the beginning of their talk Fred and Ed castigated neo-liberal capitalism for its enfranchisement of the superficial desires of the new middle classes and for the way that it reduces politics to an empty and meaningless spectacle. Contemporary capitalism, in their view, is predicated on the the theft of the future by fundamentally selfish and self-destructive people.
But they think that ths situation is curable - but only if people stop being armchair revolutionaries and realise there is another world beyond the bland and apathatetic world of the politically disengaged masses.
They believe that they have come up with a viable blueprint for an alternative to neo-liberal capitalism. This a a model of a prgamatic system of government that bypasses the self-important individualism of today's political culture. It is a system based upon ideas of the common good rather than individual utility maximisation (Fred and Ed's intellectual heroes seem to be Plato and Zizek). Here, people are ruled by a wise elite - the grand council - who are not democratically elected as such but chosen from a number of local councils on the basis of their virtues and technical expertise. These are people who due to their 'excellence' have earned the right to decide.
Council members should be self-confident, assertive, knowledgeable and trustworthy. They are not motivated by self-interest because they have been trained for public service is special academies. They both believe and have pride in their political system and the political constitution on which it is based. The model has other features as well, such as model of socialised economic development. But this was its most striking and important feature.
There were a number of questions at the end, most of which were directed towards questions of accountability, the psychological motivations of the council members and the obvious similarities between this model and those proposed by radical conservatives in the 1930s.
Overall, a really stimulating presentation and discussion (that continued in the student bar afterwards).
Neil Turnbull
Wednesday, 24 March 2010
Sane in the Membrane
This morning our seminar discussion in Phil 301 touched upon the relationship between philosophy and madness. We talked about the idea that philosophers all seem to be mad or at the very least depressive. I thought it would be interesting to flip this around and think about the question of philosophy and sanity. This is a question which has, for better or worse, been omitted from recent philosophy. In contrast, it has been very fashionable to discuss the insane, as we see in Foucault’s History of Madness and Deleuze’s Schizo-Analysis, and indeed it is quite commonplace and even fashionable to suggest that everyone has a bit of madness in them. Why is this? Why is philosophy bereft of descriptions of sanity? What does a human have to be to be sane? It is very tempting to answer this question by resorting to clinical or negative definitions i.e. a subject is sane if they do not exhibit the symptoms of madness. If madness - which can be the result of many things, both internal and external - is not present, then the subject is sane. This would correlatively entail that when certain neurological patterns are present a subject is sane. While this may be true in a clinical sense, it remains unsatisfying for explaining why sanity does not have a rich conceptual heritage in our everyday existence and our philosophical heritage, and it does not explain why it is absent from our bank of cultural tropes and memes. I mean we could easily imagine an evolutionary account of insanity but not sanity. We just don’t see movies and great poetry made about sane people. Drama and excitement is probably always more interesting, which is why what the swashbuckler and adventurer does, would be considered mad in the ordinary sense. I’m not saying sanity is absent from culture, it just always seems more tacit. I can’t think of any great philosopher who has dealt with this issue in depth off the top of my head, at least in a positive sense. Erich Fromm did write the on the sane society but that was a critique of the illusion of sanity. Again, what does it mean to go sane?
Therefore, the question of sanity would make for a very interesting philosophical research proposal (second years? Dissertations? Any takers?). What does it mean to be sane? Adopting a provisional ordinary language approach we might mention the following positive features to get us started: stability, regularity, mental harmony, reasonableness, sobriety, coolness, judgemental, soundness. These would I suppose be some basic touchstones albeit internal human qualities; this would have to be compounded by external factors such as a flourishing society, an ability to keep friends, social stability and opportunity, and a low crime rate. All of these remain provisional of course, since one can easily show that the mask of the psychopath and sociopath is their ability to adopt the ‘reality’ of the sane; this would be where they would function best. The juridical definition of compos mentis (mental know-how or ability), although more attractive and useful, would seem to fall short in light of this also.
I think it is worth considering sanity outside of a hard rational approach. One of the first things that I think I would suggest would be a phenomenological principle. Sanity would, as Husserl suggest be intentional. It would always already be world-oriented. Sane existence would require the backdrop of a world to always accompany whatever conscious content we experience. This would entail that the world and not solipsism is always at stake for us. Once this is in place any other deviation from it can be accounted for, or have a base origin from which different content can be derived from. On top of this I think it would be wise to consider sanity in terms of moderation. [Kind of like leaving the radio on for the dog when you leave the house!] This would be compounded by an Aristotelian principle. Moderation requires a practical and measured orientation towards the world, one which is both habituated and open to new possibilities. In this sense, the human subject will have a degree of freedom and necessity, balance as well as the ability to cope with unpredictability. I do think that we can learn from Derrida’s deconstructive logic here also. The binary between sane/insane is both basic and overly reductive. If we looked at sanity from a deconstructive perspective we can see why sanity requires a smidge of, if not insanity, at least the very least some minimal deviance. If our lives always have some degree of undecidability and disjointedness, then this is absolutely necessary for a sane existence. This is because sanity requires an ability to engage in struggle and overcoming. The ability to cope with conflict signifies a distinct and world-oriented maturity; in a sense learning to live with the struggle that we are. In addition, we can thus we can say that sanity requires self-development. There is also a moment here where the deconstructive logic would trump Hegel and Freud. If consciousness is a demand for self-recognition, and a desire to possess the others self recognition, then this can lead to all types of mental deferrals and insurmountable neurosis. If human existence is disjointed, then the deconstructive approach would allow us to see the incessant demand for self-recognition [think of the myriad places this is evident in contemporary culture and market hyper-narcissism] overcome, since those who are sane are in less need of being recognized; again an example of maturity, unlike the child who always demands constant attention. To put in simple terms, people who are aware of their lack of control, and exist in relation to and are comfortable with this unpredictability, aware of the limitations that face us all, and who do not think the world owes them a favour, are the sanest of all. Sanity requires understanding how abilities and limitations are intertwined and that this is our normal condition. It is just absurd to suggest that we are essentially success or essentially failure. Sanity requires an attention for out amor fati. Humans are more ambiguous than that, we have the ability to cope with the fact that it is alright to be both good and bad at the same time. Politically, and this is another big question, this has to be matched and cultivated in a just society.
The question of sanity is an intriguing question? Can anyone think of representations in literature of sane people? Has there ever been a celebration of sanity? Brief Encounter is a movie that springs to mind. But that would not hold a candle in the canon compared to Hamlet’s teetering on the brink.
Therefore, the question of sanity would make for a very interesting philosophical research proposal (second years? Dissertations? Any takers?). What does it mean to be sane? Adopting a provisional ordinary language approach we might mention the following positive features to get us started: stability, regularity, mental harmony, reasonableness, sobriety, coolness, judgemental, soundness. These would I suppose be some basic touchstones albeit internal human qualities; this would have to be compounded by external factors such as a flourishing society, an ability to keep friends, social stability and opportunity, and a low crime rate. All of these remain provisional of course, since one can easily show that the mask of the psychopath and sociopath is their ability to adopt the ‘reality’ of the sane; this would be where they would function best. The juridical definition of compos mentis (mental know-how or ability), although more attractive and useful, would seem to fall short in light of this also.
I think it is worth considering sanity outside of a hard rational approach. One of the first things that I think I would suggest would be a phenomenological principle. Sanity would, as Husserl suggest be intentional. It would always already be world-oriented. Sane existence would require the backdrop of a world to always accompany whatever conscious content we experience. This would entail that the world and not solipsism is always at stake for us. Once this is in place any other deviation from it can be accounted for, or have a base origin from which different content can be derived from. On top of this I think it would be wise to consider sanity in terms of moderation. [Kind of like leaving the radio on for the dog when you leave the house!] This would be compounded by an Aristotelian principle. Moderation requires a practical and measured orientation towards the world, one which is both habituated and open to new possibilities. In this sense, the human subject will have a degree of freedom and necessity, balance as well as the ability to cope with unpredictability. I do think that we can learn from Derrida’s deconstructive logic here also. The binary between sane/insane is both basic and overly reductive. If we looked at sanity from a deconstructive perspective we can see why sanity requires a smidge of, if not insanity, at least the very least some minimal deviance. If our lives always have some degree of undecidability and disjointedness, then this is absolutely necessary for a sane existence. This is because sanity requires an ability to engage in struggle and overcoming. The ability to cope with conflict signifies a distinct and world-oriented maturity; in a sense learning to live with the struggle that we are. In addition, we can thus we can say that sanity requires self-development. There is also a moment here where the deconstructive logic would trump Hegel and Freud. If consciousness is a demand for self-recognition, and a desire to possess the others self recognition, then this can lead to all types of mental deferrals and insurmountable neurosis. If human existence is disjointed, then the deconstructive approach would allow us to see the incessant demand for self-recognition [think of the myriad places this is evident in contemporary culture and market hyper-narcissism] overcome, since those who are sane are in less need of being recognized; again an example of maturity, unlike the child who always demands constant attention. To put in simple terms, people who are aware of their lack of control, and exist in relation to and are comfortable with this unpredictability, aware of the limitations that face us all, and who do not think the world owes them a favour, are the sanest of all. Sanity requires understanding how abilities and limitations are intertwined and that this is our normal condition. It is just absurd to suggest that we are essentially success or essentially failure. Sanity requires an attention for out amor fati. Humans are more ambiguous than that, we have the ability to cope with the fact that it is alright to be both good and bad at the same time. Politically, and this is another big question, this has to be matched and cultivated in a just society.
The question of sanity is an intriguing question? Can anyone think of representations in literature of sane people? Has there ever been a celebration of sanity? Brief Encounter is a movie that springs to mind. But that would not hold a candle in the canon compared to Hamlet’s teetering on the brink.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
